As previously noted the case of George Brodie, a clerk in the Post
Office Savings Bank, residing at 50 Deans Road, is a little different from that
of most Conscientious Objectors, principally in that he was one of the minority who did not claim to derive their objection from religious belief.
For a start, he had taken action even before he had to. In advance of the
introduction of conscription he had written to his MP giving the reasons why he
thought he should be exempt, and had received what must have seemed like an
encouraging reply, alluding to the process of applying to the
local Military Tribunal, in his case under the Hanwell
Urban District Council. Brodie did not delay in doing so when the Local Tribunal was set up
(although he apologised for not sending the claim in earlier), citing the
dual grounds of conscience – objection to
participation in warfare which I regard as morally wrong – and of
hardship – parents are old and infirm and entirely
dependent upon my earnings.
Specified Allowable Grounds of
Appeal included:
D: On the ground that serious
hardship would ensure if the man were called up for Army service, owing to his
exceptional financial or business obligations or domestic position.
F: On the ground of a
conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service.
Case
Number: M993. (National Archives Reference: MH 47/14/40)
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO CENTRAL TRIBUNAL dated 25-7-1916
I applied for a rehearing of my case under Section 2 of part
III of the Military Service Regulations (Amendment) Order, 1916 to the local
Tribunal, who refused to hear the case. I appealed against this decision to the
Appeal Tribunal, who also refused to rehear. The grounds upon which I claimed a
rehearing are as follows:-
I feel sure that in March I convinced the Tribunal at
Hanwell that I had a conscientious objection to warfare and had I been willing to
accept non-combatant service I have reason to think I should have been given
it... By the Local Government Board circular of 1st June, however,
it is laid down that exemption from all military service should be given if
that alone will meet the case, and in view of recent decisions I believe that
were my case reheard now I should be granted exemption conditional upon being
engaged upon work of national importance. That suggests that at the time of my
hearing in March the Tribunal were not fully aware of their powers, and that
therefore I am entitled to a rehearing.
The response of the Appeal Tribunal was brief; with “No” writ large on the form, it too
refused to rehear the case, and leave to appeal (to the Central Tribunal) was refused,
as had happened in April when he had complained:
I
appeal against the decision of the Middlesex Appeal Tribunal in totally disallowing
my claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The hearing accorded was
very short. I produced a letter from a friend bearing out my statements but it
was not read aloud and it was apparently ignored. I was prepared to produce
further evidence that I am actuated by conscientious motives, but I was not
given any opportunity of doing so.
The letter from a friend is not on the file, so the
allegation of its being ignored may well be justified No doubt the view of the Military
Representative, who supplied his own version of what he took to be Brodie’s
views, had carried more weight:
The alleged
conscientious objection is not based on religious grounds but on political
grounds. The appellant considers that a policy of disarmament should have been
pursued by all the Nations before the War, and that the British representatives
in foreign affairs could have prevented the War had they done their duty. He
admits the necessity of an army for defensive purposes, but will not admit that
this is a defensive war.
It is
merely a case of muddled political theories, and of a refusal to face
facts.
[signed]
James Morley
MILITARY
REPRESENTATIVE
18th March 1916
This paraphrase of the appellant’s position was probably based
on what he had said at this original hearing; Brodie’s written statements do
not give so much detail, emphasising instead what he thought was his legal and
moral entitlement under the regulations in force (as well as the “hardship”
aspect). His initial formulation was more non-specific (humanist or even merely
non-denominational) than “political”:
... I believe that human life is
sacred and that to participate in its destruction or deliberately aid those so
engaged is to do grave wrong, and so strongly do I believe this that I cannot
undertake duties conflicting with my belief...