The
Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War, by Peter
Hennessy. Allen
Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 2002, xxi + 234 pp. ISBN 0 713 99626
9.
Even before it starts, this book plunges the
reader into the nightmare world it investigates, with endpapers (at front and
back, produced more fully on pp 164-8) listing ‘Probable nuclear targets in the United Kingdom:
Assumptions for planning’. This 1967 document of the Joint Intelligence
Committee names 65 ‘targets related to nuclear
strike capability’ and 20 major cities, in every
part of the country, so we can see just how close the perceived threat came to
home. The text fills in the details of
what it would have meant.
Peter Hennessy displays 'The Cold War state which British insiders built
alongside the existing one, from roughly 1947 onwards' (p. xiii) and which his
researches and discoveries, in the Public Record Office (PRO) and among surviving
participant insiders themselves, have brought to light. The nuclear factor was, as he says, central
throughout the period and as such it is the focus of his study, presented in
six fact- and figure-packed chapters (and earlier summarised to an appreciative
audience in the Penguin History Lectures 2001).
Some of the material will be familiar, in general terms at least, to
those who lived through that era, especially if they tried to expose and oppose
the machinations of the Cold War state.
For surviving participant outsiders there may be a certain grim
satisfaction in being shown how right they were, not only on the major issue of
the scale of nuclear devastation and how close to the brink of it we came, but
about the activities of Special Branch - they were watching quite a lot of us - and Civil
Defence - no doubt many volunteers meant well, but what a grotesque farce it
was. These and other accoutrements of
the Secret State are exposed extensively, though not exhaustively.
Although the
author remains a corridors-of-power man, relishing contacts in the upper
echelons, the unguarded remark of the once-powerful, and the machinations of
government at the highest level, he accords sympathetic attention to the
activities and viewpoint of dissidents, highlighting for example the ‘Spies for
Peace’ episode of Easter 1963. For him
the surprising thing is not that a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
developed, but that it took so long, and he cites official statements and
analyses which he considers would have kick-started it years earlier, if made
known to the public. In this context the
Strath Report of 1955 was a primary source which was still closed to him at the
time of writing but has since been opened by the PRO, perhaps thanks to his
efforts in getting at and publishing its gist.
Those reviewers who have drawn the inference that after all nuclear
deterrence ‘worked’ (and that CND was wrong) are ignoring quite a lot of
the story. As Hennessy notes: ‘It is simple to the point of being seriously
misleading to suppose that the creation of a nuclear weapons capability on both
sides of what became the Cold War… offers an all-embracing
explanation of why the nuclear taboo has not been broken…’ (p.xi)
It is easier to answer the question ‘what if’ x number of bombs had been used (see Table) than ‘what if’ they had never been invented
or had remained the monopoly of one country plus or minus its allies, although
in the second case, at least a vast amount of money would have been saved.
The title gives
a slightly exaggerated idea of the book’s coverage, largely limited as
it is to the nuclear-armed aspect of the Cold War and to certain departmental
sources - probably the most significant with regard to policy-making - in
Whitehall: the Cabinet Office (which alone covers a multitude of sins), the
Prime Minister‘s Office, and Defence. One way in which the work could usefully be
built on would be by looking in more detail at manifestations and ramifications
of their policies. For example, further
material is available on surveillance of the peace movement, Admiralty
reactions to anti-Polaris demonstrations, and on the war-games exercises and
detailed plans drawn up by practically all and sundry. To dip one’s toes briefly into these last,
murky waters: the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), as well as
conducting elaborate Atom Bomb Target Studies all over the country (PRO: [National Archives ref.] MAF 99/562 1952 etc.) was
diligent in considering matters ranging from seed supplies in wartime to
monitoring of farm produce for radioactive contamination in wartime, the
effects of radiation on bull semen, and the slaughter of livestock following
nuclear attack. All departments were
required to think about and prepare for the prospect. The Ministry of
Labour would, via a National Service Officer, direct any person in Great
Britain to perform any service of which he ['or she' is implicit] was
considered capable, restrict workers from leaving jobs, and so on. Defence Regulations covered nursing, police,
fire, merchant navy; certain other industries and services. The Home Office excelled both in scaring
scenarios and hilarious absurdities, with its much-satirised sixteen pages of Advice
to the Householder. ‘Public control after attack’ was the subject of special consideration; Civil
Defence Wardens, and/or your local Street (Party) Leader, would coordinate the
effort and should be obeyed. Church
bells were to be rung to signify fallout coming within one hour. Housing and Local Government proposed
arrangements for emergency sanitation and storing of water. Under a dispersal policy ‘priority classes’
including pregnant women, children, and disabled, totalling about 9.5 million
or 43% of the population, were to be moved from major centres to reception
areas. Even the Ministry of Pensions and
National Assistance was ready at one stage, if there was a nuclear war, for the
NA Scheme to be modified and known as the War Assistance Scheme. An Index of Official Announcements on such
matters was held in readiness for eventual broadcasting.
One finding
that emerges from documents and interviews is that the state was not so
monolithic, and did not present such a united front with its allies, as
opponents often tend to assume. There are recurrent allusions to anxiety about
the chances of US over-reaction to Soviet ‘provocation’, and the USA wais
frequently portrayed as a threat to world peace (plus รงa change),
needing to be restrained by British reasonableness (well, perhaps some change
there), for which British nuclear clout – ‘enough nuclear power to prevent
foolish decisions to our detriment by the US’ (p. 62) – was seen to be
required.
In spite of
the end of the Cold War and its effects on international relations, the final
chapter reminds us powerfully that this is far from being all over, past
history in a supposedly, in some ways, more secure world. Several nuclear bunkers may now be derelict
or refurbished as tourist attractions, but the top people still have their
bolt-hole and every British Prime Minister has to decide whether to authorise,
for posthumous implementation, mass murder on an awesome scale. Nuclear submarines carry sealed orders, ready
in the event of that say-so to go and kill - whom? - when the rest of us are
dead.
In spite of
its subject, this is an entertaining and not an over-long or difficult read,
with the bonus of sharing the author’s pleasure in his research, and triumph at
finding the odd significant gem whose ‘sensitivity’ seems to have escaped notice, lurking in an obscure
file. While it is an excellent
introduction, there are several areas in which the story could be expanded, and
it is reasonable to hope is
likely to be, with researchers taking an interest in the topic. Many files are there to be explored and new
ones being released all the time, so that more works of this quality and accessibility
may be produced on Britain’s nuclear past, reaching as it does into our present
and future.
L.W.
First published in the journal
Medicine, Conflict & Survival, 2003.
 |
| From inside the book's back cover |
Extract from PRO file HO
226/71:
Casualties from a heavy
nuclear attack on the United Kingdom
1958
HO Scientific Advisers’ Branch
Casualty estimates for ground burst 10 Megaton
bombs, Table1:
No. of Bombs
|
No. killed (no evacuation)
000s
|
5
|
7,479
|
10
|
12,216
|
20
|
17,735
|
30
|
21,051
|
40
|
23,487
|
45
|
24,884
|
The
comment is added that estimates are almost certainly too low.
